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In a recent article 1 H.A. Ashford and D.M. Risinger presented a
thought-provoking "theoretical overview" of the constitutional
aspects of presumptions and assumptions in the criminal law. In
seeking to evaluate how well one aspect of criminal procedure uses the
concept of "rationality" to achieve "justice," their discussion raised
many interesting and important questions concerning the nature and
quality of the criminal process. Although much of their analysis is
unquestionably correct, we believe that some of its most basic
theoretical positions are clearly erroneous and would not lead to either
a fairer or a more rational criminal procedure. This article,
accordingly, will begin by analyzing Ashford and Risinger's
argument in the light of the present state of the law and will then
proceed to a discussion of the broader implications of the theoretical
questions their arguments raise.
I.
Ashford and Risinger quite properly stress that, while con-
siderations of comparative convenience may have been the moving
factors that have led to the use of presumptions in the trial of an issue
of fact, such considerations of convenience, no matter how
compelling, are not a constitutionally sufficient basis for upholding
the use of presumptions in the criminal law. 2 In order to satisfy
Ashford and Risinger's test of constitutional validity, the use of
presumptions in the trial of issues of fact in criminal proceedings must
meet at least two further conditions: first, a "rational connection"
must exist between what are called the "basic facts" and the "fact
t A preliminary version of this article was presented at a conference held at the Center for the
Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, California, on March 30-31, 1970.
* Professor of Law, Duke University. A.B. 1955, J.D. 1957, Columbia University; Dip. Int.
Law 1962, Cambridge University; S.J.D. 1966, Harvard University.
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J.D. 1953, LL.M. 1955, Georgetown University.
1. Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions. Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A
Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE LJ. 165 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Ashford & Risinger].
2. Id. at 180.
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presumed"; second, there must be a high probability that innocent
defendants will be able successfully to challenge the existence of the
presumed fact so as to defeat the applicability of the presumption.3
Under their theory, as the likelihood that innocent defendants may
challenge the existence of the presumed fact' sufficiently to defeat the
applicability of the presumption increases, the degree of rational
connection between the basic facts and the presumed fact necessary
to sustain the use of the presumption decreases. In an example which
Ashford and Risinger give, presumably as the limiting case, a rational
connection or correlation between the existence of the basic facts and
the presumed fact of 51 percent might be constitutionally sufficient if
the probability that an innocent defendant will be able to defeat the
applicability of the presumption is almost 100 percent.4 Thus their
two-pronged test aims to assure that presumptions are used only when
it is extremely unlikely that they will lead to the conviction of innocent
defendants. In this regard, they completely reject the suggestion that
the required strength of the logical connection between the basic facts
and the presumed fact should vary according to the legislature's
power validly to punish a man, if it so chose, merely on proof of the
basic facts.5 As a subsidiary but important point, Ashford and
Risinger insist that when the defendant comes forward with enough
evidence to defeat the applicability of the presumption, the
presumption should completely drop out of the picture. This is the so-
called Thayer rule7 which has been adopted by the A.L.I.'s Model
Penal Code.8 They reject the so-called A.L.I. minority view that, when
the applicability of the presumption has been defeated, the judge may
nevertheless instruct the jury that the basic facts may be regarded as
"strong evidence" of the presumed fact.9
Although the courts have not recognized the validity of some of
the theoretical views advocated by Ashford and Risinger, the
3. Id. at 180-86.
4. Id. at 185-86.
5. Id. at 177-79.
6. Id. at 194-202. In examining the various contentions made by Ashford and Risinger
concerning the use of presumptions in the criminal law, we shall assume, for purposes of
discussion, that they are correct in asserting that the same evidence will have a greater impact on
the jury when labeled a "presumption" than when it is not so labeled. There is, however, little
empirical evidence available on the question.
7. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 336-37 (1898).
8. ALl MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(5) (Proposed Off. Draft 1962) (formerly ALl MODEL
PENALCODE § 1.13(5) (rent. Draft No.4, 1955)).
9. SeeALI MODEL PENALCODE § 1.13,Alternative5(c) (rent. Draft No.4, 1955).
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Supreme Court has for a long time refused to accept Justice Holmes'
suggestion in Ferry v. Ramsey0 that, in deciding how strong the
rational connection must be between the basic facts and the presumed
fact, the presence or absence of power in the legislature to make the
basic facts a sufficient basis for imposing criminal liability is a
relevant consideration. Indeed, the-Supreme Court's recent decision in
Turner v. United States" has now removed the possibility of any
lingering doubts on this matter, for Turner was a case in which
Congress clearly desired to reach b oth the basic fact-possession of
narcotics-and the presumed facts which, in one instance, were
receiving narcotics with knowledge that they were illegally imported
and, in the other, distribution of narcotics other than in the original
stamped package.'2 The prohibition against the importation of heroin
and other narcotics and the statutory presumption that one in
possession of such narcotics has knowledge of their illegal
importation originated in a 1909 statute.13 In 1914, this statute was
supplemented by several revenue measures which included the
precursor of the present prohibition against distributing heroin and
other narcotics in other than the original stamped package. 4 The 1914
legislation also imposed a prohibitive tax on the manufacture of
smoking opium'5 and a requirement that those engaged in the opium
and cocoa leaf traffic register with the Government and pay an
occupational tax. 8 What might be called the "real" purpose of these
&&revenue" measures is revealed in one of the House Reports
accompanying the 1914 legislation. The Report specifically states
that, having already prohibited the importation of opium for non-
medical purposes, Congress was attempting totally to suppress the
domestic manufacture of opium for smoking purposes by regulation
of the domestic opium trade in what it considered to be the only
10. 277 U.S. 88 (1928).
II. 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
12. The statute, 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) (1964), makes it a crime to "purchase, sell, dispense, or
distribute," and the presumption operates with respect to all of these four possible violations.
For conciseness, our discussion of the statute will employ the term "distribute," together with
its adjectival and substantive forms, as a generic reference which includes the other aspects of the
statute.
13. Act of Feb. 9, 1909, ch. 100, § 2, 35 Stat. 614 (1909), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 174
(1964).
14. Act of Dec. 17, 1914,38 Stat. 785 (1914), as amended, 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) (1964).
15. Act of Jan. 17, 1914,38 Stat.277 (1914), as amended, 26 U.S.C. § 4711 et seq. (1964).
16. Act of Dec. 17, 1914,38 Stat.785 (1914), as amended, 26 U.S.C. § 4701 etseq. (1964).
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constitutional way-the imposition of a prohibitive tax on the
manufacture of opium.17
This restricted view of the reach of the commerce power and the
attendant need for Congress to rely on the customs and taxing powers
to achieve its objectives now seems quaint. Most observers would
think it too clear for argument that Congress now can prohibit the
mere possession of narcotics. If anyone doubts that Congress is
interested in punishing the mere possession of narcotics, he need only
be referred to developments subsequent to Leary v. United States"8
where the Supreme Court held that the statutory inference from the
basic fact of possession of marijuana to the existence of the presumed
fact, illegal importation, was not warranted. Congress has now indeed
indicated that it wishes to take advantage of the expanded view of its
power under the commerce clause to make possession of marijuana
and other narcotics a crime. In recently enacted legislation, Congress
has made possession of marijuana an offense. 9 In so proceeding,
Congress is only repeating the approach it took to the problem of
LSD, mere possession of which has been a federal offense since 1965 .2
17. H.R. REP. No. 22, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1913) (accompanying 38 Stat. 277 (1914), as
amended, 26 U.S.C. § 4711 el seq. (1964)). See also H.R. REP. No. 23, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1913) (accompanying 38 Stat. 785 (1914), as amended, 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) (1964)) where the
commitment of the United States to the world wide suppression of the narcotics traffic is
stressed, and it is again specifically stated that the only way the Congress could eliminate all but
the "legitimate medical" traffic in narcotics was by the exercise of its custom and taxing
powers.
All these statutes were initially enacted,.of course, in the days before Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942), when it was thought that, under its power to make laws in the general welfare,
Congress could only regulate people or goods actually moving in commerce. If it wished to
impose a greater degree of regulation, Congress was forced to rely on its revenue powers as it
actually did in the case of narcotics. In support of these revenue measures Congress could forbid
distribution of narcotics in any container other than the original stamped package and try to
make possession of narcotics in a package without tax stamps sufficient evidence of violation of
such a statute. Beyond this, however, Congress could not go. Indeed, only a few years after being
enacted, the statute imposing a regulatory tax on heroin narrowly escaped being declared
unconstitutional as an attempt to invade the sphere of regulation reserved to the states under the
transparent guise of being a revenue measure. United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919).
18. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
19. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
513, §§ 202(c),404(a)(Oct.27, 1970).
20. 21 U.S.C. § 321(v)(3) (Supp. IV, 1969), makes the possession of LSD punishable under
21 U.S.C. § 360a(c)(I) (Supp. IV, 1969). The 1965 Act did this by permitting the Secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare to designate substances having a potential for abuse because
of their hallucinatory effects, an authority which he exercised in 30 Fed. Reg. 13903 et seq.
(1965), now appearing as amended in 21 C.F.R. § 320.3(c)(3) (1970). In 1968 Congress, in Pub.
L. 90-639, specifically included referefice to LSD in what is now 21 U.S.C. § 321(v)(3)
[Vol. 1970:919
CRIMINAL PRESUMPTIONS
The new legislation repeals, as of May 1, 1971, the statutes involved in
the Turner and the Leary cases, as well as the statute punishing the
possession of LSD, and substitutes in their place one comprehensive
law dealing with all -aspects of a very large number of specifically
mentioned narcotics and drugs.21 This legislation does not rely on any
statutory presumptions of the type involved in Turner and Leary to
assist the prosecution in proving its case; they are no longer
necessary.22
Nevertheless, the Court in Turner quite properly held that the
existence of the presumed facts-"importation" or distribution other
Ithan in the "original stamped package"-must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.23 Congress having so defined the crime, the
Government was bound by that definition regardless of what
Congress' underlying purposes might have been. Accordingly, the
Court made clear that, with respect to facts which establish guilt or
innocence, the sufficiency of the rational connection between the basic
facts and the presumed fact must be judged by the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" test.2 This result was certainly to be expected. In
(Supp. IV, 1969). In White v. United States, 395 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1968), these provisions were
upheld against the challenge that a federal prosecution thereunder, without an attempt to show
any effect or connection with interstate commerce, was unconstitutional.
21. See Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, §§ 401-
11, 1101(a), 1105(a) (Oct.27, 1970).
22. Section 515 of the Act, id., creates certain typical affirmative defenses. Anyone asserting
that his "possession" of prohibited items is lawful must prove that he comes within the
statutory exemptions. Ashford and Risinger's discussion of affirmative defenses, which they
analogize to presumptions, is examined at notes 58-69 infra and accompanying text. In
discussing these limited aspects of the Act, it should not be inferred that we do not recognize the
questionable features of the bill, such as the "no-knock" provisions. See § 509 of the Act, id.
23. 396 U.S. 398 (1970). See also note 24 infra.
24. While Justice White's opinion for the Court is not as clear as one might wish, and while
he declared that the 21 U.S.C. § 174 presumption (knowledge of illegal importation with
regard to cocaine) was not even more likely than not, his treatment of the 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a)
presumption (distribution other than in the original stamped package) leaves no doubt that the
Court has adopted the "beyond a reasonable doubt" test. That presumption, with regard to
cocaine, was struck down because there was a "reasonable possibility" Turner had either stolen
the cocaine himself in the original stamped package or had obtained it from a stamped package
in possession of the actual thief. 396 U.S. at 422-24. With regard to heroin, on the other hand,
this presumption was upheld because "there is no reasonable doubt" that the heroin was not
purchased from the original stamped package. Id. at 419-22. These holdings, together with
the discussion upholding the 21 U.S.C. § 174 presumption with regard to heroin, id. at 407-18,
where the Court held that the use of that presumption did not violate Turner's right to be con-
victed "only on a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt," leave no doubt as to the effect
of the Court's decision. See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), where the Court applied
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard to certain factual determinations in juvenile
court proceedings.
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March of 1969, the Committee on Rules and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States had promulgated a
preliminary draft of proposed rules of evidence for the United States
district courts and magistrates.2s These rules, to which Ashford and
Risinger do not advert, specifically provide that although proof of the
basic facts may be regarded as sufficient evidence of the presumed
fact, the existence of all facts-including presumed facts-that
establish guilt or innocence or are elements of the offense charged or
negative a defense must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.2
Furthermore, the proposed rules also provide that the jury must be
expressly informed that it may reject any statutory presumptions. 2
These rules would hardly make sense if the Court, in Turner, had been
unwilling to hold that the presumptions themselves must meet the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" test. The proposed rules also provide
that once the applicability of a presumption is defeated, it drops out of
the trial. In the case of facts establishing guilt or innocence or
elements of the offense charged, the presumption is defeated by the
presence of evidence which the judge believes does not permit a
reasonable juror, on the basis of all the evidence, to find the presumed
fact beyond a reasonable doubt.28 Finally both Turner and the
25. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE, PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
AND MAGISTRATES (Prelim. Draft March 1969).
26. See id. Rule 3.01. Since Ashford and Risinger only discussed presumptions in the context
of facts "establishing guilt or innocence," we have restricted our discussion to facts of that
nature. In criminal trials, facts which do n6t come within these categories are normally required
to be proved only by a preponderance of the evidence, the standard normally followed in civil
actions. Accordingly, if a presumption were used to prove this type of fact, its validity would be
judged by the same standard rather than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.
27. Id.
28. See id. Rule 3.01(b). This provision is more favorable to the accused than tlle ALl
proposal under which the presumption is defeated when "the Court is satisfied that the evidence
as a whole clearly negatives the presumed fact." ALl MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(5)(a)
(Proposed Off. Draft 1962). After Turner, thevalidity of the ALl proposal isvery doubtful.
Presumably tL. Judicial Conference's Proposed Rules will satisfy most of Ashford and
Risinger's objections, Ashford & Risinger 196-201, to the ALl proposals. We believe that CAL.
EVID. CODE § 607 (West 1966), which they criticize for requiring the defendant to convince the
jury of a reasonable doubt concerning the existence of the presumed fact, requires, almost of
necessity, a preliminary judicial assessment similar to that contemplated under the federal
proposals. Cf. CAL. EVID. CODE § 604, Comment by Assembly Committee (West 1966).
Indeed, when combined with the Turner requirements which will undoubtedly be imposed upon
the states, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the new California rules-although not as
favorable to the defendant as the proposed federal rules-meet most of Ashford and Risinger's
objections to the use ofpresumptions.
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Advisory Committee's notes to the proposed federal rules make it
clear that the particular verbal form in which a presumption is
couched is not crucial. For example, the same results flow whether
possession is made "prima facie evidence" or is made "sufficient
evidence for conviction unless the defendant explains the possession to
the satisfaction of the jury."'
The implications of our discussion thus far may be summarized as
follows:
1. The Supreme Court has adopted, at least for the federal
courts, several standards for the use of presumptions in criminal
cases. A very strong rational connection which meets the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" test must exist between the basic facts and the
presumed fact. In addition, the burden of persuading the jury of the
existence of the presumed fact must always be on the prosecution. It
may reasonably be anticipated that the same standards will be applied
in state criminal prosecutions, either as a result of voluntary adoption
by the states or as a result of future decisions of the Supreme Court.3
2. The high standards of proof with which the Court has
surrounded presumptions, together with the expanded notions of the
reach of congressional power, have considerably reduced whatever
importance the use of presumptions might formerly have played in
criminal prosecutions in the federal courts t.3 The same conclusion
might be in order with respect to criminal prosecutions in the state
courts. One of the few almost universally recognized presumptions in
the state courts is the jury instruction that, in a prosecution for the
knowing possession of stolen goods, knowledge that the goods are
stolen may be inferred., from the unexplained possession of recently
stolen goods.3 2 Typically, this so-called presumption is not the result
of any legislative action but merely the result of a state supreme
court's approval of a jury instruction to this effect or affirmance of a
conviction in which the only evidence of knowledge was the
29. Both types of presumption received identical treatment in Turner. The Advisory
Committee's Note to Rule 3.01, supra note 25, mentions several different verbal forms in which
presumptions can be couched but which will be treated in an identical fashion.
30. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), where the Court held that determinations of fact
in certain state juvenile-court proceedings must be based on the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard.
31. See also Note, The Unconstitutionality ofStatutory Criminal Presumptions, 22 STAN. L.
REv. 341,354 (1970).
32. See, e.g., Stapleton v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 475, 124 S.E. 237 (1924). The same facts
also give rise to a presumption that the possessor was the actual thief. Id. See also 9 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2513 (1940).
Vol. 1970-9191
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unexplained possession of recently stolen goods. The only important
issue involved here is whether a sufficient rational connection exists
between the unexplained possession of recently stolen goods and the
knowing possession of such stolen goods. For, whether or not the jury
is instructed on the point, it is very likely to make this inference even if
no specific reference is made to a presumption. Accordingly, even if
all "presumptions" were struck down-a position that Justice Black
advocated in Turner 34-because they place the burden of coming
forward on the defendant and because they deny the defendant the
right to have the evidence on which he may be convicted presented to
the jury, the defendant is still confronted with the same dilemma. If
the jury is likely to convict him on the basis of the evidence of recent
possession that has been presented by the prosecution, he will have to
come forward with evidence, regardless of his constitutional right to
remain silent. The situation is not like that in a narcotics prosecution
where the jury is told that, from unexplained possession, it may infer
that the narcotics were distributed in a package not bearing tax
stamps or were illegally imported-something that would not
ordinarily occur to the jury.
3. The courts have never recognized Ashford and Risinger's
second requirement concerning the use of presumptions in criminal
prosecutions: namely, the requirement that there must be a very high
probability that an innocent defendant will be able to introduce
evidence sufficient to defeat the applicability of the presumption. This
second requirement raises some important philosophical questions
about the nature of the legal process, and it is to these questions that
we now turn.
II.
The second constitutional requirement that Ashford and Risinger
suggest should be imposed upon the use of presumptions in criminal
trials is premised on the false assumption that the overriding purpose
33. 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 32, § 2513. See, e.g., Stapleton v. Commonwealth, 140 Va.
475, 124 S.E. 237 (1924).
34. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 425,430-33 (1970). See also 22 STAN. L. ReV.,
supra note 31, at 351-52, which is particularly concerned that the use of presumptions permits a
defendant to be convicted without the presentation of all the evidence to the jury. This Note
unfortunately devotes only a brief section to Turner, id. at 352-53, undoubtedly because the
decision was handed down while the Note was in its final stages of preparation. We shall discuss,
in Part IV infra, some underlying practical considerations which should be taken into account
when considering the role of presumptions in criminal trials and the desirability of abolishing
their use.
35. A frequently used statutory presumption in the state courts is one making possession of
[Vol. 1970:919
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of criminal procedure is to prevent, if possible, the conviction of any
innocent defendants. Of course, the criminal process in any civilized
society is designed to protect the innocent. This concern is often
expressed in the aphorism that it is better that "5(?), 20(?), or 100(?)
guilty men should go unpunished than that one innocent man should
be convicted."' ' In adopting the requirement that an accused may not
be convicted unless the trier of facts is convinced of his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, the criminal law is surely demonstrating its concern
for the protection of the innocent. But two things must be noted about
,the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. First, its adoption
amounts to a flat rejection of the doctrine that it is better that all
guilty men should go unpunished than that any innocent men, or even
that as few innocent men as possible, should be punished. Second, and
much more important, once a standard such as the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard is adopted, it necessarily acquires a
dynamic logic of its own which, in some of its aspects, will not always
be consistent with some of the basic underlying purposes of the
standard.
McCoy v. United States37 provides a graphic illustration of this
last assertion. In McCoy, the defendant, in a felony case, tried to
plead guilty at the close of the Government's evidence to a related
misdemeanor for which the maximum possible penalty was six
months in jail. By this stage of the trial, the evidence against the
defendant was sufficient for the case to go to the jury on the felony
charge. When the defendant rose to change his plea to guilty after
consultation with counsel and the trial judge, the judge asked him all
the prescribed questions designed to determine whether the defendant
appreciated the nature and the inevitable consequences of his action.
The defendant made all the stock replies. Before the trial judge
accepted the plea, however, he asked the defendant "one more
question."
The Court: Did you in fact do that?
The Defendant: Did I take somebody's property?
burglary tools prima facie evidence of the statutory crime of possession of burglary tools with
intent to commit burglary. The main problem here is in defining what "burglary tools" are. See
Benton v. United States, 232 F.2d 341 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
36. Toward the end of the 17th century, Matthew Hale used the ratio of five to one.
Blackstone raised it to ten to one. In the late middle ages, Sir John Fortescue favored a twenty-
to-one ratio in capital cases. See Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of
Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 881-82 (1968).
37. 363 F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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The Court: Did you take their property without right-in this case an
automobile?
The Defendant: No, sir.33
The judge advised the defendant that the court could not allow him to
plead guilty if he had not taken the property in question. This
colloquy followed:
The Defendant: Your Honor, if I am willing to plead to this lesser charge,
could I plead?
The Court: You can't plead before me to a charge to which you say
you are not guilty. No sir, you cannot do that.39
Following the return of thejury, the trial proceeded and the defendant
was ultimately convicted of the felony and sentenced to eight months
to three years in jail. The conviction was affirmed on appeal by a
somewhat embarrassed court of appeals. The appellate court
expressly stated, however, that trial judges are not required to inquire
into a defendant's reasons for pleading guiltyD Trial courts should, of
course, make sure that the defendant has the capacity to and does
appreciate the nature and the consequences of his guilty plea. They
should also consider whether significant evidence of guilt is available.
Beyond that, however, trial courts should not go. A defendant is not
obliged to concede his guilt or the inevitableness or correctness of an
eventual'jury verdict. 41
The Supreme Court's opinion in McCarthy v. United States'2
did not detract from the soundness of this position. In McCarthy the
Court quite properly held that the proper and efficient administration
of justice requires literal compliance with the mandate in Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 43 that the trial judge address
the defendant personally to ascertain whether he understands the
nature of the charges and the consequences of the plea; the judge
cannot substitute the assurance of counsel for apersonal examination
of the defendant." The Court in McCarthy also adverted to the
38. Id. at 307.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 307-08.
4 1. Id. A few years after the McCoy case, the same court of appeals reversed a conviction for
second degree murder after the trial judge refused to accept a plea of guilty to manslaughter
because there were inconsistencies in defendant's statement which suggested the possibility of
"self-defense." Griffin v. United States, 405 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
42. 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
43. FED. R.CRIM. P. 11.
44. Cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1970), where the Court held that guilty pleas in
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importance of fulfilling Rule I I's further requirement that the trial
judge make certain that some factual basis for the plea is present.
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Warren indicated his approval of
the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules' suggestion that this
requirement could be met in three ways: inquiring of the defendant;
inquiring of the prosecution; and examining the presentence report."
The McCarthy case, however, is no warrant for concluding that the
trial judge must be convinced that the defendant actually is guilty
before accepting the plea. Any possible doubt on this score was elimi-
nated by the rationale of theCourt's recent decision in North Carolina
v. Alford." Indeed, any other resolution of the problem would have
transformed cases which exhibit a pressing concern with fairness
toward the defendant into sterile academic exercises that are in-
different to the actual problems that confront criminal defendants.47
The most difficult case, of course, is one where the defendant
earnestly wishes to make a guilty plea for which there is a factual
basis but, at the same time, maintains that he did not commit the
criminal act in question. The notes to the American Bar Association's
Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty unfortunately devote only one
sentence to the problem, concluding that "if the defendant is called
upon to make a statement and he denies commission of the offense,
state courts will be upheld only if the record affirmatively shows that they were intelligently and
voluntarily made.
45. 394 U.S. at463 n.6.
46. 39 U.S.L.W. 4001 (U.S. Nov. 23, 1970). Even the three dissenters, in an opinion by
Justice Brennan, were not prepared to hold that a guilty plea could never be accepted if the
defendant persisted in denying his guilt. Id. at 4005. Justice Brennan had previously indicated
his unwillingness to adopt so extreme a position in his concurrence in Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742 (1970), where he agreed that Brady's guilty plea was not open to collateral attack
because there was "no indication, contemporaneous with the . . . plea, that Brady thought
he was innocent and was pleading guilty merely to avoid possible execution." Id. at 816
(emphasis added). Brady was a collateral attack on a conviction entered upon a guilty plea
under- the federal kidnapping act. The collateral attack was prompted by United States v.
Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), which struck down that portion of the act which permitted the
jury to impose the death penalty and hence operated to encourage defendants to waive their
rights to a jury trial in order to be tried by the judge who had no authority, under the act, to
impose the death penalty.
47. Since a defendant who pleads guilty under the circumstances being discussed is not even
arguably perpetrating a fraud on the court, the proscriptions of the ABA's ethics code relating
to preservation of confidences and secrets of a client and representing a client within the bounds
of the law are not applicable. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILiTy DR 4-
101(C)(2) &7-102(B)(2) (1969). Moreover, the propriety and even constitutionality of these rules
are questionable insofar as they require a lawyer to reveal the confidences of a criminal defen-
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then, notwithstanding the existence of other information tending to
verify the accuracy of the plea, it would be inappropriate for the judge
to enter the plea." 8 The major authority cited for this proposition is
the McCoy case which, although relevant to the issue, can hardly be
said to support so sweeping a proposition. The only other case referred
to in the notes supports a position contra to that taken by the ABA. 49
Only slightly less cryptic and somewhat uncoordinated with the
Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty on this issue, the ABA's
Proposed Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and the
Defense Function provide that if an accused discloses to his lawyer
facts which negate guilt and the lawyer's investigation does not reveal
a conflict with the facts disclosed by his client, the defense lawyer may
not properly participate in presenting a plea of guilty without
disclosure of such facts to the court. Presumably, this standard
applies regardless of how certain the lawyer is that his client will be
convicted of a more serious charge.50 At the same time, prosecutors
are admonished not to acquiesce in a plea of guilty when the accused
maintains his innocence unless a complete disclosure is made to the
court 5' Such complete disclosure, however, would then trigger the
application of the ABA's Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty to
dant whom the lawyer is representing. The Code of Professional Responsibility does not ex-
plicitly attempt to meet any of the arguments raised in ABA Opinion 287, which reached a
diametrically opposite conclusion. See also New York County Opinion 259 (1928). Both opin-
ions are reprinted in V. COUNTRYMAN & T. FINMAN, THE LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY
232-37 (1966).
48. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY § 1.6, Commentary at 34 (Approved
Draft 1968).
49. See Maxwell v. United States, 368 F.2d 735,739 n3 (9th Cir. 1966). The court did note
that the case before it arose before the adoption of Rule I I of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure expressly required that the trial court find a factual basis for the plea. It is
presumably because of this caveat that the case is cited, with the signal "cf." in support of the
ABA position. For a more complete set of citations to the relevant cases on the issue, see the
majority and dissenting opinions in North Carolina v. Alford, 39 U.S.L.W. 4001 (U.S. Nov.
23, 1970). See also note 50 infra.
50. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 5.3 (rent. Draft 1970). See also Commentary, id. at 241. In recognizing that the
defense lawyer is not completely bound by the accused's view of the facts, this provision is at
least less rigid than the position taken in the Commentary to the ABA Standards Relating
to Pleas of Guilty. supra note 48, at 34, with which it is also somewhat inconsistent.
51. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 4.2 (rent. Draft 1970). See also Commentary, id. at 107.
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preclude the court from accepting the plea, even in a case where the
court was certain that the jury would find the defendant guilty of a
more serious offense and that the defendant was completely deluded in
believing that he was "really" innocent. This cursory disposition in
the ABA's Standards is much too glib a treatment of a very serious
problem. While no one wants to see innocent people convicted, neither
should one be indifferent to the fact that, from the defendant's point
of view, five years in jail is better than fifteen. To adopt supposedly
rigorous, formal requirements, that will be disregarded in
practice-because judges avoid raising the question, defendants know
better than to be candid if they are asked, and lawyers simply ignore
the standards-is to close one's eyes to reality.5 2 Surely this area
requires more honest and critical thought before a definitive position
is taken.0 Fortunately, the Court in Alford has now held that the
Constitution does not require any such simplistic approaches to the
problem.
McCoy's case and now Alford's case highlight a very serious
theoretical issue. As we have seen, in the excerpts from his colloquy
with the trial judge, the issue confronting McCoy was not whether he
was guilty or innocent but whether a reasonable jury would be-
lieve, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was guilty. These are ob-
viously different questions, and a rigid formalism which, in the name
of truth, refuses to recognize the differences is unjust. A rational
man must accommodate himself to the dynamics of the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" test. If it is likely that ajury will believe, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that he is guilty, he must do something about the
situation. His knowledge that he really is innocent, that the burden
of persuasion is on the prosecution, and that "plea bargaining" with
innocent defendants is frowned upon by people who are unlikely ever
to be defendants in criminal cases will provide scant consoiation to
him. If he has a prior conviction which can be used to impeach his
veracity should he decide to appear as a witness on his own behalf, his
52. See Weinberg & Babcock, Book Review, 76 YALE LJ. 568 (1967). This review of D.
NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GuiLT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL
(1966), focuses on the important considerations involved from the defense lawyer's viewpoint.
The book itself examines the institutional use of guilty pleas in the criminal process from the
point of view of the criminologist. More such useful work is obviously needed to compile
meaningful statistics. Naive academic assumptions that a defendant is always better off in
having a jury assess his guilt or innocence are not an acceptable substitute. See Note, The
Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1387 (1970).
53. See note 49 supra.
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position will be particularly desperate. Lest we appear cynical, we
should stress that any standard of proof occasionally imposes this
sort of dynamic on the criminal process, making guilt or innocence-
the factor the criminal process ostensibly is designed to establish-
largely irrelevant. The criminal process may avoid this dilemma only
by imposing the formal standard that only guilty people can be
convicted and enforcing the standard by not convicting anyone.
Presumably to meet this problem, Ashford and Risinger propose
that presumptions may be used only upon a showing of two factors: a
rational connection between the basic facts and the presumed fact,
and a high probability that innocent defendants will be able to defeat
the application of the presumption.- The logic of this suggestion
surely requires, in addition, that every other inference open to a jury
must meet this test-for most inferences which the jury must make in
a criminal trial have not been institutionalized as presumptions and
yet, from the defendant's point of view, are just as important. This
same logic also requires that, in criminal cases, not only must the jury
believe the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before
returning a verdict that the defendant is guilty-which is also an
inference-but, in every class of case in which the test is applied, the
likelihood that an innocent defendant will be convicted must also be
low. For while the "beyond a reasonable doubt" test is designed to
insure akainst the conviction of innocent defendants, in practice it
may allow the conviction of a significant number of innocent
defendants in some types of situations.
Unfortunately, however, Ashford and Risinger's suggested
supplementation of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" test would be
unable to achieve its objective. First, it cannot be applied in practice.
As Ashford and Risinger seem to recognize, 5r the test must be
quantified to be meaningful, and this cannot be done. How can one
possibly determine the percentage of innocent persons who will be
unable to defeat the operation'of a presumption or any other
inference, including the inference of guilt from a belief in guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt, to which they are subject? The relevant factors are
not only unmeasurable; they are also incommensurate, involving
questions of so-called "objective fact" and subjective evaluations of
the availability and competency of counsel. Second, even if by some
miracle it were possible to quantify the relationship between
innocence and the ability to overcome a presumption or any other
54. Ashford & Risinger 180-86.
55. Id. at 183.
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inference, such quantification does not determine that any particular
defendant will overcome the presumption. It only tells us that it is
rational to believe that he will-a completely different matter. Nor
would such quantification necessarily reveal very much about how our
criminal process operates in the "long run." If quantification of
probabilities discloses anything about the real world, it is that, when a
sufficiently large number of instances is considered, the predicted
statistical correlation will be seen to exist. In practice, this means that
it is very likely that a sample consisting of a very large number of
instances will achieve a certain degree of proximity to the predicted
statistical correlation. Given the small number of sufficiently similar
instances that ever reach the courts in many areas of the law, the most
that one can often compute is the likelihood that a sample containing
that number of instances will come within a certain degree of
proximity to the expected statistical correlation.5 The only way to
make sure that innocent people will be able to defeat the presumptions
and other inferences made against them-and one cannot distinguish
presumptions from other inferences in this regard-is to make it
impossible to convict anyone.
In short, while Ashford and Risinger's theory is prompted by
praiseworthy motives, it ignores the dynamics of the criminal process
and, given its preoccupation with actual guilt or innocence, could
actually lead to misguided trial tactics. It could not possibly be
applied in the real world; and, even if it could, it would not come as
close to solving the problem as Ashford and Risinger think. Certainly,
important things can and should be done to decrease the possibility of
convicting innocent defendants. 57 Meaningful reform will not be
accomplished, however, by an excessive preoccupation with formal
requirements divorced from the concrete realities of the legal process.
III.
The most controversial part of the theoretical framework
proposed by Ashford and Risinger is the extension of their analysis of
56. For example, the general class of defendants in prosecutions under 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a)
(1964), is not precise enough for accurate statistical correlations. Defendants under this statute
could be white or black, first or multiple offenders, rich or poor, all these factors would be
relevant to their chances of success. Such a class is unlike the situation where blood types are
used to help determine paternity, and statistics on a large number of people are easily obtainable
because everyone is a member of the relevant classes. For a discussion of the meaning of
probability statements see R. BRAITHWArrE, ScIENTiFic EXPLANATION (1960).
57. Some possible measures are discussed in notes 71-90 infra and accompanying text.
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presumptions to what they call assumptions, a category usually
referred to as affirmative defenses. Affirmative defenses can
profitably be called assumptions because they not only shift the
burden of coming forward with evidence to the defendant, as do
presumptions, but they also shift the burden of persuasion from the
prosecution to the defendant.58 Under Ashford and Risinger's
proposal, the state can validly impose the burden of persuasion upon
the defendant only upon proof that:
1. A strong rational connection exists between the other
elements of the offense (A and B) and the negative of the so-called
affirmative defense (-X); and
2. The probability that an "innocent" defendant will be unable
to prove the affirmative defense (X) is very low."'
With all deference, we must submit that this proposal is extremely
ill-advised. What gives the proposal some plausibility is, undoubtedly,
the fact that many so-called affirmative defenses arose at common
law purely as a matter of convenience. Innumerable exceptions existed
to the crimes recognized at common law. Since most of these
exceptions were not applicable in the usual situation, and the
defendant was particularly able to know if they were present in his
case, it made a great deal of sense to place the burden of coming
forward on the defendant. Most so-called affirmative defenses at
common law do no more, and they are therefore not properly
instances of what Ashford and Risinger call assumptions." From this,
the imposition of the burden of-persuasion upon the defendant in a few
instances was not a very great step. Accordingly, if these "true"
common law affirmative defenses relate to elements of the crime, it
seems very sensible to impose at least the first requirement suggested
by Ashford and Risinger-a strong rational connection between the
58. In point of fact, few of the generally recognized "affirmative defenses" actually shift the
burden of persuasion to the defendant. Among the few are duress and, at common law, insanity.
In most jurisdictions, the majority of so-called affirmative defenses such as self-defense and alibi
merely impose a burden of coming forward with evidence on the defendant. Affirmative defenses
of this second kind really operate in the same manner as do presumptions and, if they pertain to
what are considered elements of the offense charged, should bejudged by the same standards as
are presumptions. Most true affirmative defenses are specifically included in the statutes
establishing the crime to which they are applicable. See, e.g., Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 515 (Oct. 27, 1970). See generally
C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 683-84 (1954); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2512 & 2514 (3d ed.
1940); ALl MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13, Comments at 108-14 (rent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
59. Ashford & Risinger at 189-93.
60. See note 58 supra.
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other elements of the offense charged and the negative of the
affirmative defense-even after the threshold question of comparative
convenience has been strongly decided in favor of putting the burden
of persuasion on defendant. Since the 19th century, however, the
trend has been away from the fragmentarily defined crimes of the
common law and toward comprehensive statutory definitions of
crimes in which the legislature attempts to state clearly the elements of
the offense and the factors which may be considered either in
exculpation or mitigation of guilt. In many such cases, the legislature
can be said to have meant what it said. The offense it wished to punish
consists of those elements of which the prosecution has the burden of
persuasion. The category of affirmative defenses is merely an instance
of legislative grace which it may grant or withhold in its discretion. In
this case, it is not at all clear why the strong rational connection test
should be applicable. Indeed, many important reasons suggest that it
should not.
Consider, for example, the "affirmative" defense of insanity. This
defense is discussed by Ashford and Risinger' in the context of
Leland v. Oregon,6" a case of which they strongly disapprove. In
response to a charge of murder in the first degree, the defendant had
raised the defense of insanity. Oregon law at that time placed the
burden of persuasion concerning insanity on the defendant, requiring
him to prove his insanity "beyond a reasonable doubt." The Supreme
Court of the United States affirmed, with only Justices Frankfurter
and Black dissenting. The case is disquieting for two related reasons.
First, in requiring the defendant to prove his insanity beyond a
reasonable doubt, Oregon had departed from the common law
practice of requiring affirmative defenses to be proved only by a
preponderance of the evidence. At common law, only the prosecution
was ever required to meet the "beyond a reasonable doubt" test. The
Oregon statute was unique, in this regard, in the English-speaking
world and has since been repealed." The Leland case is also contrary
61. Ashford & Risinger at 202-03.
62. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
63. Id. at 798 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). McCormick called the statute "extraordinary."
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 58, at 684 n.26. The only other reference by either Wigmore or
McCormick to any instance in which the burden of persuasion with respect to an affirmative
defense required proof beyond a reasonable doubt is to Statev. Scott,49 La. An. 253, 21 So. 271
(1897), where the Louisiana court overruled a prior case that had imposed the burden of proving
insanity upon the defendant in accordance with the "'beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. 9 J.
WIGIORE, supra note 58, § 2501, at 361 n.l.
64. ORE. Rev. STAT. § 136.390 (1955). Oregon now requires the defendant to prove his
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to the growing belief that a state must recognize insanity as a defense
to a crime. This.belief finds some support in the fact that most states
have now departed from the common law practice of placing the
burden of persuasion on the issue of insanity on the defendant and
have adopted the federal practice of requiring the prosecution to prove
the absence of insanity beyond a reasonable doubt." Under this
practice, the only burden remaining on the defendant is to put the
question of insanity in issue. Insanity is, strictly speaking, then, no
longer an "affirmative" defense.
Let us assume, however, as indeed we must, that there are many
possible defenses to crimes that the legislature is not constitutionally
bound to recognize. Why should there be a strong rational connection
between the elements of the offense, A and B, and the negative of the
affirmative defense, -X? The same objection can be raised, with even
greater force, against Ashford and Risinger's second requirement for
the use of affirmative defenses, namely a high probability that
"innocent" defendants will be able to prove X, the affirmative
defense. Leaving aside the very serious problems with this second
requirement that have already been discussed in connection with
presumptions, why must the legislature consider a man, against whom
elements A and B have been established beyond a reasonable doubt,
as "not worthy of punishment?" Why cannot the legislature regard
him as worthy of punishment but still deserving of a chance to show
why he should not be punished in this case? This is not like the case of
presumptions where the legislature has chosen to include an element,
Y, in the description of those who are worthy of punishment. In that
case, it is only proper that the existence of element Y should be
established by the prosecution in accordance with the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard.6 If the legislature wanted to remove
element Y from consideration on the question of guilt, it should have
said so. But in the present situation, the legislature has said that proof
of elements A and B is sufficient for imposing punishment on the
defendant. If the legislature has constitutional power to make an
offense out of elements A and B, it is ridiculous to say that it cannot
make another element, C, an exculpatory factor unless it is highly
insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. Law of May 31, 1957, ch. 380, § 1 [1957] Ore.
Laws 507.
65. Cf. 343 U.S. at 798. The federal standard was adopted in Davis v. United States, 160
U.S. 469 (1895).
66. See text accompanying. notes 10-24 supra.
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probable, more probable, or even probable either that not -C is the
case or that a defendant will be able to prove C, if in fact C is the case.
Consider, for example, a statute which prohibits the discharge of a
firearm in a public place but allows the defendant to escape liability if
he can prove that he had not intended to harm anyone. A requirement
of either a strong rational connection between discharging the firearm
and intending to harm someone or of a high likelihood that a
defendant who really had not intended to harm anyone would be able
to convince a jury of that fact would be difficult to justify. Ashford
and Risinger would, of course, impose both requirements and, if the
requirements were not met, would strike down the statute. To avoid
the unfortunate consequences of this result, would they permit the
state to define a crime in terms of elements A and B and then to make
element C, the burden of persuasion of which is on the defendant,
relevant only to the question of punishment? Or would they say that
this too is improper? Certainly, from the point of view of the
defendant, making C an affirmative defense to the crime is preferable,
since the defendant can avoid the stigma of conviction if he is
successful. But even the second alternative is better than ten years in
jail. To shackle a legislature by limiting its options in the ways
Ashford and Risinger suggest may lead to the legislature's refusal to
recognize any defense at all, "affirmative" or otherwise. This triumph
of form over substance leaves the defendant materially worse off.
Consider, again, the case of insanity and assume even that the
state is constitutionally required to recognize the "defense" of
insanity. At the present time, a state could constitutionally adopt the
strict M'Naughten" standard, requiring a determination of whether
the accused "was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what
was wrong," and place the burden of persuasion of proving sanity
upon the prosecution in accordance with the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" test. A state might, on the other hand, wish to adopt the
Durhams "product of a mental disease" test" and place the burden
of persuasion, "by a preponderance of the evidence," upon the
67. M'Naughten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718,722 (H.L. 1843).
68. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
69. The standard was first adopted in New Hampshire in the nineteenth century. See State v.
Pike, 49 N.H. 399,408 (1870); State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369,398 (187 1). Both cases were relied
on in Durham. See 214 F.2d at 874-75.
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defendant, thereby creating an "affirmative" defense. It would not be
unrealistic to expect that fewer "innocent" or "insane" defendants
will be convicted under the first set of definitions and procedures
than under the second; but any theoretical formulation which forces
a state to favor the first alternative, because of its greater "formal"
validity, is subject to justifiable ridicule. Whatever the relevant
formal considerations might be, a rational defendant and a rational
defense lawyer might very well prefer the second alternative in the
not irrational belief that more defendants will be found "insane"
under this test. The same sort of practical considerations also sug-
gest that removal of the issue of sanity to a separate proceeding in
which the disposition of the convicted defendant is the sole issue
might not necessarily be a preferable one from the defendant's point
of view, however formally satisfying it might be to some theorist,
because all the burdens of persuasion are placed on the state.
Formalization of legal theory is only a means of achieving justice.
It is not an end itself. A theory formally designed to protect the
"innocent" defendant might, in practice, provide less protection to
actual defendants than would a more flexible but ostensibly less
morally justifiable theory. The pursuit of truth to the exclusion of
other considerations can lead not only to no convictions-it can lead
to too many. Justice and rationality are not, of course, incompatible
values. Rationality, however, must be determined in the light of the
overall goals of social institutions. Excessive preoccupation with the
rationality of one component can be irrational when judged from the
point of view of the entire scheme of institutional arrangements in a
particular society. We submit that this is the case here. At any rate we
are surprised that Ashford and Risinger were unwilling even to
consider these broader questions.
IV.
Our criticism of the Ashford-Risinger analysis of presumptions
should not suggest indifference to the practical effects of
presumptions in many criminal cases. Too often, an obligation is
placed on defendants to come forward with evidence in circumstances
where they have little possibility of meeting the burden. It is doubtful
if many innocent defendants are convicted, but the possibility of a
miscarriage of justice cannot be ignored, particularly when the
difficulty of rebutting a presumption is combined with a system of
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differential leniency in sentencing in a manner which provides
institutionalized encouragement for guilty pleas.70
Our concern is that Ashford and Risinger propose an unrealistic
cure that may be worse than the disease when the plight of the
innocent defendant can be remedied more effectively by other
techniques which stand a better chance of being adopted. In many-if
not most-cases the problem is not the existence of a high probability
that innocent defendants as a class will be unable to challenge
sufficiently the existence of the presumed fact. The difficulty is that a
particular defendant under indictment may lack the resources to
produce favorable evidence concerning the basic or presumed facts
because of three deficiencies in existing criminal procedure: the
inadequacy of criminal discovery which may prevent the defendant
from knowing what evidence will be used against him until trial and
which may deny him access to evidence favorable to his cause even at
trial; the absence, in many cases, of funds for investigation or for
securing expert witnesses; and the unwillingness, sometimes
encouraged by the government, of witnesses to discuss the case with
defense counsel before trial. These handicaps could affect the
presentation of the defense in any criminal case, but their significance
is likely to be magnified when presumptions are involved. This
combination of the inadequacy of formal discovery, the uncooperative
government witness, and the absence of resources for independent
factual investigation seem, therefore, the most appropriate target
upon which those who are genuinely concerned with the protection of
the innocent defendant should concentrate their efforts.
Criminal discovery in the federal courts provides an example of
the kind of reform that is necessary. Under the present rules, a
defendant, upon a proper showing, may discover books, papers,
documents, tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions
70. The ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice Standards Relating to
Pleas of Guilty has assumed that "conviction without trial will and should continue to be a most
frequent means for the disposition of criminal cases:' ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF
GUILTY 2 (Approved Draft 1968). In its opinion, the existing plea bargaining system which
produces a high percentage of guilty pleas "cannot operate effectively unless trial judges in fact
grant charge and sentence concessions to most defendants who enter a plea of guilty. . . For
this reason, the standards affirm the propriety of courts granting charge reductions or
sentencing concessions when the public interest in the effective administration ofjustice would
thereby be served. Id. at 38. In substance this means leniency is encouraged for pleas of guilty.
Differential leniency apparently is constitutionally permissible. McMann v. Richardson, 396
U.S. 1034 (1970); Brady v. United States, 396 U.S. 809 (1970). See also North Carolina v.
Alford, 39 U.S.L.W. 4001 (U.S. Nov. 23, 1970).
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thereof that are within the control of the government." He may also
discover written or recorded statements or confessions made by the
defendant within the control of the government and the recorded
testimony of the defendant before the grand jury. 2 In addition, a
defendant can obtain access to the results or reports of physical or
mental examinations and of scientific tests or experiments made in
connection with his case, again when they are within the control of the
government.73 In a capital case, he is also entitled to the names of
government witnesses three days before trial.74 Finally, the case law
warns the government that the suppression of evidence favorable to an
accused, if he has requested it, violates due process, irrespective of the
good or bad faith of the prosecution.7 5 The matters immune from
discovery under the present law are much more impressive, however,
and include evidence and leads which may be crucial to counsel
obliged to combat a presumption. Specifically, the weight of
authority would now deny a defendant access to the statements of a
co-defendant, 76 the names of government witnesses in non-capital
cases,77 the names of persons having information concerning the
offense whom the government does not plan to call,7" his own record
of prior convictions, 7 and the record of prior convictions of
government witnesses. 80
In a prosecution for a narcotics offense a defendant may there-
fore be'less concerned with the abstract effect of presumptions
arising from possession than with his inability to ascertain the identity
of the informant before trial, his inability to cross-examine an
informant effectively on the basis of prior convictions, while facing
impeachment if he chooses to testify,81 his inability to ascertain the
71. FED. R. CRim. P. 16(b).
72. Id. 16(a).
73. Id.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1964).
75. See Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
76. United States v. Edwards, 42 F.R.D. 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); United States v. Turner, 274
F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Tenn. 1967).
77. United States v. Chase, 372 F.2d 453 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 907 (1967); United
States v. Tanner, 279 F. Supp. 457 (N.D. Ill. 1967); United States v. Westmoreland, 41 F.R.D.
419 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
78. United States v. Chase, 372 F.2d 453,466 (4th Cir. 1967).
79. Cf. PROPOSED AMY.NDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE
UNITED STATES DISTRCT COURTS Rule 16(a)(l)(iii) (Prelim. Draft, 1970).
80. Hemphill v. United States, 392 F.2d45 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 877 (1968).
81. Cf. District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-358, § 133 (Oct. 27; 1970), overruling case law which limited use of convictions to
impeach defendants in criminal cases. See Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir,
1965).
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identity or whereabouts of other witnesses not called by government,
or his inadequate knowledge of what a co-defendant has told the
police. The effect of a presumption is much different in this setting
than where such information is routinely made available to a
defendant. Indeed present limitations upon discovery may make it
impossible for defense counsel to make a reasoned decision of
whether to recommend a plea of guilty or advise his client to testify
if he goes to trial. Effective cross-examination will be the exception
rather than the rule.
Fortunately, the law's niggardly attitude toward criminal
discovery is now in the process of revaluation. The proposals of the
American Bar Association's Project on Minimal Standards for
Criminal Justice82 and the recent proposed amendment to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure s3 are indicative of a changed attitude
which will go far toward permitting defendants to rebut presumptions
effectively where there is evidence to support their contentions.
Criminal discovery directed against the government is an effective
investigating tool only when the government has control, possession,
or custody of the information which is sought. It can not be more ef-
ficient than the government's own investigation. A defendant should
be able to investigate a case effectively without the necessity of rely-
ing upon the government. In a minority of cases where financial re-
sources do not constitute a problem, effective defense investigations
are possible. But, in most cases, the resources of the defendant will be
inadequate to investigate a case properly, and, in the case of an indi-
gent who cannot obtain pretrial release, the task may prove to be be-
yond the capacity of even the most devoted counsel. The need can be
met by government subsidized investigative services, provided either
by a permanent staff8 or made possible through the allocation of
funds which permit the hiring of investigators for special cases," and
by reimbursement to defense attorneys for out-of-pocket costs in-
curred in conducting their own investigations." Funds should also be
82. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL (rent.
Draft. 1969).
83. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS Rule 16 (Prelim. Draft, 1970). See also I C. WRIGHT,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 252-54 (1969).
84. See District of Columbia Legal Aid Act § 2, D.C. CODE § 2-2201 (1967).
85. See Criminal Justice Act of 1964, § 2, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
86. See id.; District of Columbia Legal Aid Act § 8, D.C. CODE § 2207 (1967).
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provided for expert witnesses in those cases where an analysis of
ballistics, narcotics, or blood tests may be crucial. The defendant
should not be forced to rely solely upon the opinions of government
experts. s7
The third major problem commonly faced by defense counsel is
the unwillingness of prosecution witnesses to discuss the case with
defense counsel before trial, particularly in narcotics cases. In the
absence of judicially supervised deposition practice, it may be
appropriate that a potential witness should have the right to decline to
talk with counsel, and, in unusual cases, a prosecutor should be able
to obtain a protective order from the court if a witness is harassed.8S
But there can be no justification for government counsel explicitly or
implicitly to silence a witness who would otherwise be willing to
discuss the case with defense counsel. The cases are beginning to
recognize the problem and to provide relief. 9 Hopefully this trend will
continue.
We submit that many of the real concerns of Ashford and
Risinger can be alleviated by practical reforms including broadening
the avenues of investigation in the manner suggested. The chances of
improving the position of the innocent defendant through measures of
this nature are much greater than through artificial suggestions
designed primarily to restrict the use of presumptions, particularly
since, after Turner,1° presumptions will play only a very diminished,
although perhaps still not insignificant, role in the administration of
criminal justice. Those who are genuinely concerned with the reform
of criminal procedure would be better advised to focus their efforts on
how the process actually works in practice than to concentrate their
attention solely on the formal characteristics of the system. The
symmetry of legal theory is important. How the law operates in
practice is crucial.
87. See Jacobs v. United States, 350 F2d 571 (4th Cir. 1965). Such funds are provided under
the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
88. FEr. R. CiuM. P. 16(e).
89. E.g., Gregory v. United States, 369 F2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
90. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
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